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ABSTRACT 
The goal of this study is to examine how the political mobilization of business interests 
influences aggregate public policy outputs in the states. We examine the relationship 
between business mobilization and general state policy liberalism, as well as policy that 
we term state“business policy climate.”We construct a measure of the“business policy 
climate” from a number of tax and regulatory indicators in the states and examine 
whether business influences it and policy liberalism using ordinary least squares 
regression.The analysis shows that business mobilization does not influence general 
policy liberalism but is a significant influence on a state's business policy climate. 
Specifically, the dominance of a state's campaign finance system by business interests 
makes policy more favorable toward business.The extent of business mobilization in a 
state is an important influence on public policy outputs but is constrained by the 
activities of other political actors such as unions. 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 
Scholars have studied the determinants of state public policy for decades. In their 
seminal work on state politics, Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993) observed strong links 
between public opinion and policy in the states. However, as Gray et al. (2002) point 
out, it is necessary to consider interest groups for a complete understanding of how 
political actors influence policy in the U.S. states. Since it is often argued that business 
interests have advantages over others, their influence on state policy deserves careful 
scrutiny. Yet, the relationship between the mobilization of the business community and 
aggregate public policy outputs in the U.S. states has received surprisingly little 
empirical attention. Furthermore, given their variation in interest-group strength, 
ideology, and policy, the states offer an ideal venue in which to examine broad 
questions of business influence. We consider whether the political mobilization of 
business influences policy liberalism and policy of more central concern to the business 
community, which we call state "business policy climate." 
 
 
Business Influence in the States 
Business interests have advantages in overcoming the collective action problems 
plaguing all interests mobilizing for political activity (Olson, 1965). Consequently, at both 
national and state levels, interest systems are numerically dominated by economic 
interests (Schlozman, 1984; Gray and Lowery, 1996). There is some disagreement 
about how this numerical dominance translates into influence on public policy. Pluralist 
or neopluralist theories expect that business interests are able to influence government 
policy by providing campaign assistance to politicians, or through the lobbying process, 
but this influence is contingent on factors such as the level of public scrutiny, 
countermobilization by other interests, and the preferences of elected public officials 
(McFarland, 2004). In contrast, structural theorists argue that business has a "privileged 
position" among societal interests in a capitalist system, where elected officials are 
dependent on business to spur the economic growth necessary to ensure reelection 
(Lindblom, 1977). Both perspectives acknowledge that business interests will often 
wield influence on public policy. As Mitchell (1997) argues, it is reasonable to assume 
that elected officials want to keep business happy both because they rely on these 
businesses to create economic growth and because of the more direct assistance 
and/or pressure that the businesses bring to bear. Not surprisingly, scholars have found 
that businesses do influence aggregate policy outputs (Quinn and Shapiro, 1991; 
Inclan, Quinn, and Shapiro, 2001). However, business does not always triumph 
because its goals are often opposed by other actors, such as unions or the public 
(Radcliff and Saiz, 1998; Smith, 2000). 
 
The extent to which relevant actors are organized varies a great deal across the states, 
and this has important policy implications. For example, Hill and Leighley (1992) find 
that states with a greater mobilization of poor voters demonstrate more generous 
welfare policies and Radcliff and Saiz (1998) find that the degree of labor union 
organization affects state spending on a variety of programs, as well as policy 
liberalism. The examination of business mobilization and influence in the states has 
generally been limited to single policy areas such as environmental policy (Potoski and 
Woods, 2002). In one exception, Gray et al. (2002) find tentative support for the idea 
that states with more politically active economic interests have less liberal policy. 
Accordingly, we expect business to be an important influence on aggregate state policy, 
but business influence should also be constrained by the actions of other political 
actors. 
 
There are strong incentives for elected state officials to accede to business. As 
structuralists note, politicians need business investment and the resulting economic 
growth to create favorable electoral conditions, making them especially responsive 
(Lindblom, 1977). However, this dynamic is essentially constant across states and is 
therefore of limited utility in explaining cross-sectional differences in policy. Therefore, 
we focus on how the variation in the effective marshalling of business resources into the 
political process may explain differences in policy. Since business interests have 
abundant resources, they have mostly relied on "insider tactics such as lobbying 
lawmakers directly." Therefore, the national-level studies usually examine the aggregate 
influence of PAC contributions and lobbying expenditures on government policy (Inclan, 
Quinn, and Shapiro, 2001; Quinn and Shapiro, 1991; Smith, 2000). Campaign 
contributions and lobbying should also be important indicators of business mobilization 
in the states. If these tactics are effective, states with a greater proportion of campaign 
contributions from business, and greater business density in the lobbying community, 
should demonstrate more conservative and pro-business policy. 
 
Several state-level political actors constrain the influence of business interests, 
however. Unions have an agenda that often runs directly counter to business interests 
by focusing on policy that is relevant to union members and the working class more 
broadly (Radcliff and Saiz, 1998). Like business, unions contribute money to 
candidates, but unlike business, labor's political strength is also linked to the number of 
members that can be turned out on election day. 
 
The preferences and deeply held beliefs of the public and political elites will also 
constrain or foster business interests. Elazar (1984) noted that individualistic cultures 
may utilize policies to facilitate the interests of businesses, and traditionalistic cultures 
may take a laissez-faire approach to economics (implying limited business regulation). 
In contrast, moralistic cultures should be more willing to use the political process to 
counter the power of economic interests and promote the public good. In addition, 
public and government ideology clearly have important influences on aggregate policy 
outcomes (Erikson, Wright, and McIver, 1993). Liberal ideology advocates more direct 
government involvement in the economy and a more aggressive mitigation of the effects 
of unfettered capitalism. As such, liberal states should demonstrate policy that is less 
favorable to business. The public's influence should be greatest on salient, gut-reaction-
type issues like gun control, abortion, and welfare, however. In contrast, the greater 
complexity of taxation and regulation (policies more relevant to business) may mute the 
opinion-policy linkage. 
 
 
When Will Business Matter? 
We consider two questions in the analysis below. Does the dominance of a state's 
interest-group system by business interests make policy in that state more conservative, 
after controlling for factors like government and citizen ideology, political culture, and 
the mobilization of other interest organizations? Or, is business influence limited to 
issues centering on the core interests of the business community? 
 
Scholars have argued that business power has a conservative influence on policy 
(Lindblom, 1977), but business is motivated by profit and is consequently most 
concerned with policies that have a clear influence on the bottom line. As a result, we 
might expect that business mobilization will have little influence on the type of 
composite policy liberalism considered by Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993). Gray et 
al. (2002) argue that the dominance of business interests may mute state policy 
liberalism through a crowding effect, however. For example, the demands of abortion 
rights or poverty advocates may be muted because politicians, with limited time and 
resources, cater primarily to economic interests. These scholars tentatively conclude 
that politicians are less responsive to the public in systems more heavily dominated by 
economic interests. Even without endorsing the crowding argument, business 
dominance may indirectly make state policy more conservative. Although business 
interests are not necessarily adamant about small government or limited welfare and 
health-care spending, successful demands for low taxes will often preclude the 
existence of generous social programs or a large public sector. 
 
Despite these real possibilities, we expect that business influence (even indirect) should 
be most highly constrained on policies that define composite policy liberalism including 
policies like abortion, gun control, and welfare eligibility. Wright, Erikson, and McIver 
(1993) find strong links between public opinion and policy on these issues. The 
relationship between opinion and policy on these issues is probably heightened 
because they are of concern to political parties, news media, and political activists. 
When public preferences are known and relatively intense, politicians will usually 
respond, limiting the influence of business (Smith, 2000). Additionally, politicians are 
likely to have their own, well-formed preferences on these ideological issues. Finally, 
labor unions typically have broad policy goals (Radcliff and Saiz, 1998), so we expect 
them to be highly active, limiting business influence on these issues. 
 
Businesses have a greater direct stake in policies that are directly relevant to the bottom 
line, such as taxation and regulation. Different business sectors have divergent political 
agendas, but they will be unified in opposing higher taxes and greater regulation. 
Nonetheless, liberal politicians may be conflicted over whether to meet business 
demands or follow their personal ideology, with liberal public opinion further constraining 
policy choices. Furthermore, a state's political culture should be an important 
determinant of its approach to business politics, with moralistic cultures being more 
willing to use the government to limit business power. Finally, many of these policies will 
also arouse the interest of unions, thus also constraining business influence. 
 
Despite this conflict, there is reason to believe that business will fare better on these 
issues. First, since taxation and regulation encompass the core interests of nearly all 
businesses, we can expect more pressure from the business community on 
policymakers. Second, since issues of taxation and regulation are less salient to the 
public than issues like abortion, gun control, and welfare, elected officials may have 
more independence from public preferences. The appropriate level of government 
taxation and regulation can easily eclipse the knowledge and interest of the public. 
Therefore, unlike composite policy liberalism, we expect a clear relationship between 
business mobilization and business policy climate. Given their broader interests, we 
expect that unions will influence both sets of policies. Ideology (both public and 
government) should have a stronger influence on composite policy liberalism than on 
business policy. State political culture should not influence composite liberalism, but 
should influence business policy, with more traditionalistic cultures demonstrating 
business-friendly policy.1 
 
 
Data and Methods 
To examine business influence on general policy liberalism (our first dependent 
variable), we use an updated version of Erikson, Wright, and McIver's policy liberalism 
created by Gray et al. (2002) that includes: welfare eligibility and activities under TANF, 
right-to-work laws, abortion regulation, gun control, and tax structure progressivity. Like 
Erikson, Wright, and McIver's (1993) measure, components were standardized and 
summed to create the index. The index ranged from −4.76 to 6.93, with a mean of −0.07 
(SD=3.13). The index correlates with Erikson, Wright, and McIver's at 0.75 and has a 
Cronbach's alpha of 0.63. 
 
The second portion of the analysis will examine business influence on state business 
policy climate, which is an aggregate policy measure comprised of tax and regulatory 
indicators. Here, we are not attempting to comprehensively measure a state's business 
climate, but rather to develop a measure based on policies at the core of the political 
interests of business. As such, our measure reflects only one portion of a state's 
business climate.2 The measure of "business policy climate" consists of nine policy 
indicators. These are: (1) the corporate alternative minimum tax, (2) the top corporate 
tax rate, (3) the percentage of revenue from corporate taxation, (4) the state's tax 
limitation status, (5) the number of pro-business legal reforms statutes, (6) the prevailing 
wage in the state, (7) the state's minimum wage, (8) new-source pollution regulations, 
and (9) air-quality regulations (see Table 1). Some indicators apply more directly to the 
interests of specific economic sectors, but taken together, they measure policy that 
concerns most of the business community. Furthermore, in addition to reflecting specific 
policy decisions, this index represents a state's aggregate approach to taxation and 
regulation, whereby states that heavily regulate labor and environmental practices are 
more likely to regulate other business activities. 
 
 
TABLE 1  
 
Factor Loadings for Business Climate Variables 
 
Variable Data Source 
Factor 
Loading 
 
Corporate alternative minimum tax Tax Foundation website 0.48 
Top corporate tax rate Tax Foundation website 0.35 
Percentage of revenue from corporate 
taxation 
Federation of Tax Administrators' 
website 
0.32 
Tax limitation status Tax Foundation website 0.35 
Pro-business legal reforms American Tort Reform Association 
website 
0.59 
Prevailing wage U.S. Department of Labor website 0.53 
Minimum wage U.S. Department of Labor website 0.39 
New-source pollution regulations Book of the States  0.50 
Air-quality regulations Book of the States  0.32 
Eigenvalue  1.73 
Cronbach's alpha  0.65 
 
 
 
Like Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993), we standardized and summed all components 
to create the measure, with higher scores indicating a more favorable business policy 
climate. The business policy index ranges from −10.64 to 11.96, with a mean of 0.0 and 
standard deviation of 4.62. With components covering several distinct policies, we might 
expect that this measure does not adequately assess a single underlying policy 
dimension. However, confirmatory factor analysis demonstrated that these policies do 
load on a single factor with all coefficients above 0.30 (see Table 1 for factor loadings 
and data sources). The single factor does not explain a large portion of the total 
variance of these nine variables (approximately 20 percent), but this is not entirely 
surprising given the diversity of components. Finally, the measure produces a 
Cronbach's alpha of 0.65, which is roughly equivalent to the liberalism measure's 
reliability (though both are slightly less than 0.70, which would indicate high reliability).3 
Though created for different purposes, this measure correlates with broader business 
policy climate indices in the expected direction4 and is also negatively correlated 
(−0.66) with Gray et al.'s (2002) update of composite liberalism. For both dependent 
variables, policy was measured in the year 2000. 
 
Before we turn to the analysis, Table 2 shows the rankings and scores of the most and 
least favorable tax and regulatory business policy climates in the states. The scores 
ranged from a high of 11.96 in Mississippi to a low of −10.64 in Alaska, with a mean of 0 
and standard deviation of 4.62. The states are ordered so that the number-one ranking 
state, Mississippi, has the most favorable business policy climate, followed by Nevada, 
South Dakota, Louisiana, and Arizona. At the other end of the rankings, Alaska had the 
least favorable business policy climate, followed by Maine and Minnesota. The business 
policy climate is in some ways related to liberalism, but it is also clearly measuring 
something different. For example, some relatively conservative states, such as 
Nebraska, Iowa, and Montana, appear relatively unfavorable to business interests. 
Perhaps surprisingly, large and dynamic economies that lead the nation in wealth 
production, such as New York and California, receive very low scores, reflecting the 
more limited focus of our business policy climate measure.5 Although these states are 
important in the national and even global economies, their success has much to do with 
nonpolicy factors, and they do have high corporate taxes, high wages, and relatively 
strict regulations. Our unidimensional measure is also not designed to account for 
states that may be favorable to particular economic sectors. For example, Delaware 
provides an excellent tax and regulatory environment for financial institutions but this is 
just one business sector, and we are concerned with those policies important to the 
average business in a given state. 
 
TABLE 2  
 
State Business Climate Rankings and Scores 
 
Rank State Score Rank State Score 
 
1 MS 11.95748 26 PA 0.165084 
2 NV 7.378955 27 MD 0.149995 
3 SD 6.809994 28 NM −0.50712 
4 LA 6.803687 29 NH −0.92906 
5 AZ 6.510223 30 WI −0.97284 
6 CO 6.462776 31 KY −1.05656 
7 OK 6.378913 32 DE −1.45441 
8 SC 4.771355 33 IL −1.61219 
9 AL 4.704113 34 NJ −1.67785 
10 VA 3.032539 35 OR −1.85299 
11 TX 2.718071 36 WA −2.24678 
12 UT 2.681212 37 MA −2.46548 
13 KS 2.306902 38 ND −2.60898 
14 MO 2.301748 39 HI −2.95108 
15 FL 2.155178 40 MT −2.96248 
16 GA 1.726579 41 IA −3.00357 
17 ID 1.540534 42 NE −3.13098 
18 TN 1.533165 43 RI −4.37246 
19 AR 1.511891 44 CT −4.39796 
20 OH 0.866924 45 VT −4.73919 
21 MI 0.748625 46 CA −5.20599 
22 NC 0.584312 47 NY −7.85591 
23 WV 0.362521 48 MN −10.0226 
24 WY 0.328311 49 ME −10.0769 
25 IN 0.247492 50 AK −10.6353 
 
 
 
 
To assess business influence on both sets of policy, we regressed the dependent 
variables on business lobbying registration and business campaign contribution 
variables, as well as union campaign contributions and union membership, government 
and public ideology, and state political culture. As noted above, business primarily 
influences policy by lobbying and/or contributing money to politicians. Therefore, we 
include measures of both. We use Gray and Lowery's registration data on all 
organizations registered to lobby to construct a business density measure for each state 
in 1999. We included the following sectors: agriculture, banking, communications, 
construction, health, hotel, insurance, manufacturing, small businesses, sports, 
transportation, and utilities. Business density is the total number of organizations and 
firms registered with the state in the above sectors (Gray and Lowery, 1996). Business 
registrants ranged from 129 to 1,177 with a mean of 431 and standard deviation of 
269.06. 
 
The campaign contribution measure was the percentage of all campaign contributions 
from PACs and individuals affiliated with business interests (specific firms and trade 
associations) from 1996–2000. These data were obtained from the Institute on Money in 
State Politics' website 〈http://www.followthemoney.org〉. We use the annual average 
of contributions between 1996 and 2000 to minimize single-year spikes. Business 
contribution percentages ranged from 11.2 to 56.2, with a mean of 35.22 percent 
(standard deviation of 9.6). 
 
We also use two variables to measure labor's mobilization. Given their grassroots 
nature, density (or percentage of union members) in the workforce is a better measure 
of their potential influence than lobbying density. We averaged density for the years 
1990 and 2000 in each state, resulting in a measure ranging from 4.9 to 30.65, with a 
mean of 15.55 and standard deviation of 6.28. The union campaign contribution 
measure is analogous to the one discussed above. This measure ranged from 1.1 to 
55.3 with an average of 17.1 (standard deviation of 11). 
 
We use Berry et al.'s (1998) measures to control for public and government ideology, 
which are each averaged for the period 1996–1999. Government ideology ranges from 
4.5 to 94.58 with a mean of 43.06 and standard deviation of 24.30. Citizen ideology 
ranges from 18.07 to 82.93 with a mean of 47.66 and a standard deviation of 14.04. We 
also control for political culture using Koven and Mausolff's (2002) update of 
Sharkansky's (1969) quantification of Elazar's (1984) categorization of the states.6 
Since moralistic states score lower on this measure, we expect a positive relationship 
between culture and business policy climate. 
 
   
   
Results 
        
The first column of Table 3 presents the analysis examining the relationship between 
our independent variables and general policy liberalism. Only 48 states are included 
because, following Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993), Alaska and Hawaii were 
excluded due to missing data. The R2 statistic for this model was 0.58, and the results 
are unsurprising. As we can see, states with more liberal citizens and states with a more 
liberal government demonstrate more liberal public policy; both ideology coefficients 
were statistically significant and in the expected, positive direction. Supporting the 
conclusions of Radcliff and Saiz (1998), states with greater union membership exhibit 
more liberal policy, even after controlling for business influence. The coefficient for 
union membership was positive and statistically significant, but the coefficient for union 
campaign contributions was not, indicating that union influence probably lies primarily in 
labor's potential to deliver votes, rather than to finance campaigns. Neither measure of 
business mobilization was significant in this model, nor was state political culture. This 
indicates that high levels of business mobilization do not make aggregate state policy of 
this type more conservative. 
 
TABLE 3  
 
The Influence of Business Interests on State Policy Liberalism and State Business Policy Climate 
 
Independent Variables Policy Liberalism Business Policy Climate 
 
Government ideology 0.040
*
 −0.062
*
 
(0.018) (0.028) 
Citizen/public opinion liberalism 0.071
*
 0.006 
(0.037) (0.051) 
Union membership 0.129
*
 −0.243
**
 
(0.073) (0.097) 
Union contributions −0.142 0.005 
(0.117) (0.177) 
Business registrants 0.001 −0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Business contributions −0.038 0.128
*
 
(0.039) (0.058) 
Political culture −0.276 0.584
*
 
(0.180) (0.257) 
R 
2
  0.58 0.55 
N  48 50 
 
 OLS estimates. Unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses;   
*
 p<0.05;   
**
 
p<0.01 (one-tailed).  
 
 
 
 
The second column of Table 3 presents the results of the same model but with business 
policy climate as the dependent variable. Again, higher values on our business policy 
index indicate greater favorability toward business in tax and regulatory policies. This 
model explains a substantial portion of the variance in business policy climate 
(R2=0.55). Although we did expect a somewhat weaker relationship between citizen 
ideology and the business policy climate, the analysis indicates that there is no 
significant relationship at all. Indeed, on this set of policies it does seem that the 
opinion-policy linkage is weakened or nonexistent once we control for other factors. The 
independent preferences of state policymakers did influence this set of policies, 
however, with more liberal officials enacting policy less favorable to business. The 
divergent influence of public and government ideology may stem from the greater 
complexity of taxation and regulatory policies compared to the policies comprising 
composite policy liberalism. Although state political culture has no impact on general 
policy liberalism, it does influence state business policy climate. States with more 
traditionalistic cultures have a more favorable business policy climate compared to 
moralistic cultures. As in the previous model, labor union membership influences policy, 
but contributions do not. Thus, high rates of union membership as opposed to campaign 
contributions seem to be the important resource that enables labor to constrain 
business in the states. 
 
Turning to the business mobilization variables, the empirical results affirm some of our 
theoretical expectations. Lobbying mobilization did not influence the business policy 
climate, but business contributions were statistically significant and positive influences 
on it. Furthermore, at the extremes, business contributions can have a large influence 
on policy. For example, if we compare Louisiana (56.2 percent of contributions from 
business) to Vermont (11.2 percent), we see a large 5.6 point increase on our business 
policy climate measure, with other factors constant. Contributions may be a better 
indicator of business mobilization than lobbying density because the contribution 
variable represents a clearer investment of resources. 
 
At first glance, the results of this analysis indicate that the narrower area of policy that 
we call state business policy climate is largely the domain of interest groups, with little 
citizen input or control. However, labor unions advocate on behalf of workers in general, 
and not just union members, and to that extent citizens are represented in these policy 
areas. The impact of union membership was quite substantial, and it is statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level in the expected, negative direction. Thus, with other factors 
constant, we can expect a 6.3 point decrease in business favorability comparing the 
least unionized state, South Carolina, to New York, which has the highest unionization 
rate. Although business interests clearly have important financial resources, unions 
have members who can sway elections and this appears to give unions some leverage. 
The consistent influence of unions on both sets of policy underscores the importance of 
labor unions as a political force in the states and also highlights the important policy 
consequences of decreasing unionization in the United States. 
 
   
Conclusion 
This study confirms the pluralist mantra that mobilization is critical to an interest group's 
success in the political process. The extent of business mobilization, along with the mix 
of countervailing forces present at the state level, explains variation in certain types of 
policy across the states. The public, elected officials, and organized labor are the 
primary influences on composite policy liberalism. Business mobilization influences the 
state business policy climate, with greater campaign financing by business leading to 
more favorable outcomes. On neither policy domain is there evidence indicating 
monolithic and unchallenged business influence. Instead, it appears that even on state 
business policy climate, business influence is constrained. Although businesses try to 
utilize their resource advantage over other groups, unions appear to partially balance 
this financial advantage with their broader membership base. Finally, as the 
conventional wisdom suggests, campaign contributions are an important source of 
business power in the states. Politicians who are more reliant on business interests for 
their reelection funding are more likely to enact pro-business policy. Considering the 
largely ineffective state campaign finance regulations in tandem with declining 
unionization rates in most states, if anything, business should become more powerful in 
the near future. 
 
   
Footnotes 
1 Radcliff and Saiz (1998) include political culture in their model but do not present 
results for this variable. Consequently, we assume it was not a significant influence on 
policy liberalism. 
   
2  When politicians and business leaders use the term business climate they are 
referring to dozens of attributes affecting the profitability of business enterprises in a 
given state. Components of a state's business environment like proximity to ports and 
natural resources were ignored in this study because they are not subject to political 
manipulation, and education and training policies were omitted because they are not 
relevant to many industries. Education spending, for example, is of greater concern to 
high-tech firms compared to agricultural or manufacturing firms. Furthermore, separate 
analysis demonstrated that these investment policies generally do not correlate with the 
taxation and regulation of business, while also not clearly constituting an entirely 
separate dimension of policy. Nor did we consider factors like electricity costs that are 
only partially (and not primarily) determined by government policy. Initially, 33 business 
climate indicators were collected from a number of sources, including other business 
climate indices created by advocacy organizations or think tanks. Examples were the 
Tax Foundation, the Small Business Survival Committee, the Beacon Hill Institute, the 
Progressive Policy Institute, the Corporation for Enterprise Development, and the 
Economic Freedom Index created by Byers, McCormick, and Yandle (1999). Once this 
initial set of indicators was collected, exploratory factor analysis was used to determine 
which variables were empirically closely related. We expected to see a few clear policy 
dimensions (ideally, separate regulatory, tax, and infrastructure investment dimensions). 
Unexpectedly, rather than suggesting a few distinct policy dimensions, only one clear 
factor emerged, which was the basis for our measure of business policy climate. 
Though the results of this process countered our initial expectations, we believe that the 
resulting policy index accurately reflects a state's general regulatory and tax policy 
stance toward the business community. 
   
3  The diversity of business interests demands the inclusion of a wide array of policies 
for a meaningful measure. Therefore, greater interitem correlations and a higher alpha 
would be difficult to achieve. 
   
4  The measure is positively correlated with climate measures created by the Tax 
Foundation (0.15), the Small Business Survival Committee (0.26), the Beacon Hill 
Institute (0.40), and Byars, McCormick, and Yandle's measure of economic freedom 
(0.31). 
 
5  Many factors influence state business climate, including historical development and 
settlement patterns, which are obviously outside the scope of this article. New York's 
important role in business and finance is driven, in part, by the decisions of many firms 
to locate in and around Wall Street over the past century or more. Furthermore, many 
states are favorable to certain industries because of a particular environment or natural 
resources possessed by the states (i.e., mining in Pennsylvania or the citrus industry in 
Florida). 
 
   
6  Sharkansky employed a nine-point scale coding pure moralistic states as 1, pure 
individualistic states as 5, and pure traditionalistic states as 9, with mixed states arrayed 
between these scores. Koven and Mausolff (2002) did not include Alaska, but since it is 
generally considered an individualistic political culture, we coded it as a 5. 
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